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very deception practiced by the prosecutor has fooled 
and misled the Defendant, but the trial court as well! 
It is for this purpose namely, that a "bill of 
particulars" forces the prosecutor to focus in and 
precisely identify specific facts, etc., necessary to 
the successful charging and conviction of an alleged 
offense that the bill of particulars was requested! 
The prosecution, having filed such a VAGUE and 
proven-AMBIGUOUS information as was herein filed, 
cannot be rewarded for having misled the Defendant and, 
implicitly, misled the Court! 
In this case, the Defendant's contention is NOT 
what he did. The Defendant knows exactly what he did. 
The request for the bill of particulars is significant 
because it forces the prosecution (1) to allege an 
offense AND (2) to prove that offense. That didn't 
happen here. 
The incongruous result shown by Judge Boyden's 
verdict was certainly not anticipated; a better-pleaded 
Information (or the requested bill of particulars) 
would have had a different result! 
The "abuse of discretion" standard for appellate 
review of the trial judge's decision (to deny the 
sought-for "bill of particulars") should be applied 
where the trial judge is in full possession of all of 
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the facts. Where, however, as in this case THE TRIAL 
JUDGE WAS NOT SO FULLY INFORMED, BUT WAS SIMILARLY A 
VICTIM OF THE PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO PRECISELY PLEAD 
THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, the standard 
should be different. 
The Appellant's Brief cites to State vs Bell, 770 
P.2d 100 (Utah Supreme Court 1988), and State vs 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-21 (Utah 1987), holding that 
in cases such as this the burden should be "shifted" to 
the prosecutor to justify the prosecutor's actions. The 
Appellee's Brief is fatally lacking in any response to 
the requirements imposed by the holdings of Bell and 
Knight! 
The Appellant has clearly shown the outcome of the 
case would have been different and that the appellate 
court's "confidence in the outcome has been eroded" and 
that a reversal of the conviction should be entered. 
The prosecution HAS NOT shouldered or met the 
"burden shifting" requirement placed upon it! 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the 
convictions, order the creation and service of a bill 
of particulars, and remand the case for a jury trial. 
II 
THE "JURY TRIAL" ISSUES 
The problem with approaching the denial of the 
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"jury trial" as demanded and AS SCHEDULED, per the 
trial court's own order is not merely for 
"sentencing" (ala six months or less incarceration), 
but for the Defendant's "constitutional right" to have 
a jury determine his guilt or innocence! [This case is 
further exacerbated by the fact that had a jury been 
empaneled, the incongruous "verdicts" found by the 
trial court may not have happened at all, due to the 
more precise nature of the presentation of the 
prosecution's theory of the case through jury 
instructions and the Defendant's response thereto!] 
Whether jail time is imposed (or available) is not 
necessarily the only issue when dealing with this most 
fundamental "constitutional right". 
The undersigned believes that the decision of the 
Court of Appeals in West Valley City vs McDonald, 94 8 
P.2d 371 (Utah Court of Appeals 1997), is misplaced, 
jurisprudentially, in this case, for the following 
reason: McDonald involved a defendant charged with a 
minor traffic offense prosecuted as an "infraction", 
for which statutorily there could be no possibility 
whatsoever of any incarceration! [As noted previously, 
much of what was stated in the McDonald decision might 
merely be dicta.] To have the trial judge "order" 
(August 20, 1998, as the "docket history" shows: see 
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ADDENDUM #5 in Appellant's Brief] the case be set for 
"jury trial" (in response to Defendant's demand 
therefor) , and then, ON THE MORNING THE CASE IS 
SCHEDULED FOR TRIAL, order that the case will proceed 
without a jury (because no jury had been called) is an 
"abuse of discretion". For the trial court to announce 
that "no jail will be imposed if I find you guilty" is 
not the proper way to do things. Such a cavalier method 
is certainly not very "judicial". 
The significant jurisprudential principles behind 
McDonald should be re-examined! The McDonald "holding" 
(sic) should be reversed or at least narrowed! 
Ill 
"SINGLE-CRIMINAL EPISODE" PROVISIONS PRECLUDE 
CONVICTION OF BOTH OFFENSES 
Appellee's counsel superficially explains the 
particular factual and legal theory upon which he 
believes appellate counsel was NOT the trial counsel-
--the case was tried. Unfortunately, that explanation 
relies heavily upon the judge's announced verdict (as 
explained at the sentencing hearing). The explanation 
ignores, however, the factual and legal issues 
associated with the charged offenses and the claimed 
proof thereof. 
The prosecution believes that the "15 minute" time 
differential between the two offenses interrupts the 
•' 7 • 
"single criminal episode" and makes it two offenses. 
That's not true. 
Both actions or series of actions had to be 
related, in time and geographic proximity, to each 
other. The "photos offense" had to be related to the 
"telephone books offense", for without the taking of 
the telephone books there could be no offense. 
Similarly, the statute expressly provides that a 
person shall not be convicted of the "substantive 
offense" and of an "attempt" when the same arises from 
a "single criminal episode". The prosecution 
especially when the prosecution so intentionally and 
consistently "stonewalled" the Defendant on the sought-
for bill of particulars to specifically identify the 
specific property alleged to have been taken as relates 
to each specific charge ought not to be allowed to 
now compartmentalize the charges and with "stopwatch 
accuracy" plead that one offense (i.e. the "theft by 
deception" of the photographs, which was NOT the 
offense the prosecution set out to prove) was committed 
and fully consummated minutes before the second offense 
(i.e. that of "attempted theft" of the telephone books) 
was committed and consummated. 
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IV 
THE "THEFT BY DECEPTION" VERDICT CANNOT STAND 
The prosecution claims the "theft by deception" 
charge is supported by the evidence and conforms to the 
statute. [The Defendant-Appellant again points out this 
is NOT the charge (i.e. related to the photographs) the 
prosecution set out to prove at trial!] 
The appellate counsel for the City ignores two 
things. First, that "theft by deception" requires an 
"economic" aspect of the crime. The statute says so! 
The law should not presume as the City's appellate 
counsel seems to suggest that if a citizen asks to 
inspect a public record and is handed the file, there 
is a "deception" which occurs if the citizen fails to 
give back the entire file (or opens the file and/or 
removes for convenience in examining the individual 
documents within that file some of those documents 
from the actual confines of the physical file. 
Secondly, the witness who gave Mr Decker the file 
testified that she was NOT deceived. 
Utah law requires that there be "reliance" in 
"theft by deception" cases. In State vs Jones, 657 P. 2d 
1263 (Utah Supreme Court 1982), the Utah Supreme Court 
wrote: 
It is clear from the face of the statute 
that reliance by the victim is an element of 
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the crime of theft by deception. In context, 
obtaining property "by deception" can only 
mean "by means of deception." Deception, 
followed by transfer of property to the 
deceiver, does not add up to theft by 
deception without the causal element of 
reliance. Even though the alleged victim is 
deceived, if he does not rely on the deception 
in parting with his property, there has been 
no theft "by deception". State v. Vatsis, 10 
Utah 2d 244, 246-47. 351 P.2d 96, 97-98 (1960) 
(involving statutory predecessor of §76-6-
405(1), which also contained no express 
reference to "reliance"); State v. Finch, 223 
Kan. 398, 573 P.2d 1048 (1978). 
657 P.2d at 1267. Emphasis added. 
When the prosecution's own witness testifies that 
there was "no deception", the trial court's finding is 
not supported by the evidence. The conviction cannot 
stand! 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant has been unfairly prejudiced by the 
prosecutor's repeated failure to provide the "bill of 
particulars", specifically describing the items of 
property alleged to have been stolen or attempted to 
have been stolen. This failure resulted in the 
Defendant misled by the "open file" disclosure as to 
the prosecutor's theory defending against charges 
exactly opposite of what the trial court judge found 
him guilty of! 
The Defendant has made a "credible argument" that 
the pre-trial discovery disclosure (i.e. access to the 
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prosecution's "screening worksheet") improperly 
distracted the Defendant and his counsel from the 
"theory of guilt" of the charged offenses actually 
accepted by the trial judge. The prosecuting attorney 
has not met the "shifted burden" requirements imposed 
upon him of convincing the appellate court was 
"harmless error". Bell, supra, and Knight, supra. 
The trial court's refusal to grant the timely-
demanded "jury trial", for these serious misdemeanor 
offenses, is unjustified. The Rules do not require the 
Defendant to "reconfirm" his "demand". The McDonald 
decision is inappropriate to this factual situation 
and/or should be more carefully revisited, by this case 
which does present the constitutional question properly 
and by a party who has standing to assert that 
constitutional question. 
The "dual" convictions (i.e. of both offenses) is 
clearly precluded by the "single criminal episode" 
statute. Furthermore, the status of the confusing 
evidence is such that the trial court's own findings 
evidence the prosecution's failure to prove the 
accused's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt". 
The Defendant's conviction of both offenses should 
be set aside. The case should be remanded to the 
District Court for a jury trial, following the 
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providing of a "bill of particulars'* identifying the 
property in question. In the alternative, the charges 
should be dismissed, outright, as the prosecution 
simply failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of September, 
1999. 
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